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In In re Himmel,' the Illinois Supreme Court addressed the dilemma
that confronted attorney James Himmel, who had been forced to
choose between reporting another attorney's misconduct 2 and main-
taining his own client's secret. The high court's pronouncements
regarding Himmel's dilemma have been widely read, though not
always with pleasure.3 Yet, attorney Himmel faced a second dilemma:
How could he accommodate his client's desire to discuss her legal
problems with him in the presence of both her mother and her fianc6,
while assuring her that their discussions would probably be deemed
privileged and thus immunized from compelled disclosure? On this
other dilemma, the Illinois Supreme Court said little, noting only that
no privilege would be recognized unless the mother and fianc6 were
* Professor of Law, Northern Illinois University College of Law; B.A., Colby
College, 1970; J.D., University of Chicago, 1974. Special thanks are due to Nick
Griswold, my research assistant, and John Austin, one of our school's librarians.
1. 533 N.E.2d 790 (I11. 1988).
2. Illinois, like most states, requires that an attorney with unprivileged knowledge
of another attorney's misconduct to report that misconduct to the appropriate attorney
disciplinary commission. See ILLINOIS RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 8.3
(1993). According to one author, California and Kentucky are the only states that do not
have provisions requiring attorneys to report the misconduct of their fellow attorneys.
Beverly Storm, Mandatory Reporting of Lawyer Misconduct: Can The Bench & Bar of
the Commonwealth Discipline Itself Without It? 20 N. KY. L. REV. 809, 809 (1993).
3. See, e.g., Ronald Rotunda, The Lawyer's Duty to Report Another Lawyer's
Unethical Violations in the Wake of Himmel, 1988 U. ILL. L. REV. 977, 991 (noting the
lack of clear guidelines for the new duty to report); Richard W. Burke, Where Does My
Loyalty Lie?: In re Himmel, 3 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 643, 654-55 (1990) (noting that the
court's failure to recognize fully the tension between the duty to maintain secrets and the
duty to report attorney misconduct is likely to cause confusion). The results of Himmel
continue to be debated. See, e.g., Carol McHugh, 'Duty to Report' Pits Lawyer v.
Lawyer, but Jury Still Out on Results, CHI. DAILY L. BULL., Nov. 24, 1993, at I
("[W]hether the ethical requirement imposed by In re Himmel is a scalpel that can excise
venal attorneys or an ax too often wielded in litigation warfare remains the subject of
debate within the legal community.").
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"agents" of Himmel's client.4 The court provided neither substantive
guidelines nor procedural rules for determining whether such an
agency relationship exists. In the hope of aiding those who may face
Himmel's other dilemma, this article will analyze who can be consid-
ered an agent of an individual client for the purpose of attorney-client
communications.5
II. HIMMEL ON THE AGENTS OF CLIENTS
In Himmel, the Administrator of the Illinois Attorney Registration
and Disciplinary Commission ("the Commission") charged attorney
James Himmel with violating state professional conduct rules by
failing to disclose to the Commission information concerning another
attorney's misconduct. 6 In part, Himmel defended his actions by
asserting that he only learned of the misconduct through information
his client, Tammy Forsberg, communicated to him. Therefore,
Himmell argued, no obligation to disclose arose due to the privilege
accompanying attorney-client communications. The Illinois Supreme
Court ruled against Himmel and found that he "failed in his duty to
report" misconduct.7 Citing People v. Williams,8 the court held that
4. Himmel, 533 N.E.2d at 794.
5. Of course, establishing an agency relation for corporate clients is quite different
and subject to much disagreement. Compare Consolidation Coal Co. v. Bucyrus-Erie
Co., 432 N.E.2d 250, 257 (I11. 1982) (accepting control-group test for corporate
agency) with Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 397 (1981) (rejecting control-
group test).
6. Himmel, 533 N.E.2d at 791. Himmel was charged with not reporting misconduct
that he discovered in the course of representing his client, Tammy Forsberg. Id.
Forsberg had been represented previously by attorney John Casey who had successfully
pursued a settlement for Forsberg in a personal injury action. Id. After receiving the
settlement funds for Forsberg, Casey converted them. Id. Forsberg informed Himmel of
Casey's actions and, after investigating and establishing that Casey had indeed
converted Forsberg's funds, Himmel drafted a settlement agreement between Casey and
Forsberg in an amount exceeding the amount due Forsberg under the personal injury
settlement. Id. The settlement with Casey provided that Forsberg would not initiate any
criminal, civil, or attorney disciplinary action against Casey. At no time did Himmel
notify the Attorney Registration and Disciplinary Commission of Casey's misconduct.
Himmel, 553 N.E.2d at 791.
The Administrator of the Commission filed a complaint against Himmel for failing to
report Casey's misconduct in violation of Illinois' reporting provision, ILLINOIS CODE
OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY Rule 1-103(a) (1987). Himmel, 533 N.E.2d at 791. The
Hearing Board found that Himmel was indeed in violation of Rule 1-103(a), but it
recommended only a private reprimand. Id. at 792. Upon appeal by the Administrator,
the Review Board found that, for a number of reasons not important to this article,
Himmel had not violated Rule 1-103(a). The Administrator then appealed to the Illinois
Supreme Court. Id.
7. Himmel, 533 N.E.2d at 795.
8. 454 N.E.2d 220 (I11. 1983), cert. denied, 466 U.S. 981 (1984).
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the information Himmel had obtained from Forsberg was not
privileged because it had been voluntarily disclosed by Forsberg in the
presence of third parties who were not Forsberg's agents.9 The high
court did not explain why the third parties, Forsberg's mother and
fianc6, could not be considered her agents. Thus, the Himmel court
left a critical question unanswered: Was the agency label inappropriate
because the mother and fiancd did not fit within the relevant
substantive criteria, whatever these were, or because there was
insufficient, if any, evidence that Forsberg's mother and fianc6 were
indeed her agents?
A review of the Illinois Supreme Court's decision in Williams offers
little insight into the rationale behind the Himmel court's agency
determination. In Williams, the defendant claimed that certain testi-
mony by a law student, who had appeared as his counsel at an earlier
criminal hearing, was privileged and should not have been admitted at
his sentencing hearing. ° The law student had provided testimony
concerning defendant Williams's demeanor during a pre-hearing
meeting at which confidential communications may have occurred."
The court concluded that the testimony about the client's demeanor
was not privileged because the meeting occurred in a courtroom where
other people observed the client, and none of these observers were
alleged to be agents of either the legal representative or his client.
2
If it had desired to provide guidance on who may be deemed a
client's agent for the purpose of attorney-client privilege, the Himmel
9. Himmel, 533 N.E.2d at 794. The Himmel court stated, "We have held that informa-
tion voluntarily disclosed by a client to an attorney, in the presence of third parties who
are not agents of the client or attorney, is not privileged information." Id. (citing
Williams, 454 N.E.2d at 220).
The Himmel court also based its conclusion that the information regarding Casey's
misconduct was not privileged on the fact that Forsberg intended for Himmel to discuss
Casey's misconduct with the insurance company involved in the underlying personal
injury action, with the insurance company's lawyer, and with Casey himself. Id. The
court held that this intended disclosure destroyed the privilege pursuant to the rule laid
down in a previous decision, People v. Werhollick, 259 N.E.2d 265 (Il1. 1970), which
held that "matters intended by a client for disclosure by the client's attorney to third
parties, who are not agents of either the client or the attorney, are not privileged." Id.
Thus, the Himmel court reasoned that "under Werhollick and probably Williams, the
information was not privileged." Id. See infra notes 10-12 and accompanying text.
10. Williams, 454 N.E.2d at 224, 239. The law student in Williams was authorized to
appear in court for limited purposes under Illinois Supreme Court Rule 711. Id. at 240.
The court assumed for its purposes that the attorney-client privilege extended to commu-
nications with this representative. Id.
I I. Id. at 239-40.
12. Id.
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court should have cited to People v. Doss, 3 an appellate decision ren-
dered one year before Himmel. In Doss, the defendant, an attorney
convicted of perjury, complained on appeal that the trial judge had
improperly denied his motion to compel production of a transcribed
interview of his former clients, Eugene and Nancy Bloomingdale, by
their new attorney, Kenneth Baughman.14 The perjury charges related
to Doss's grand jury and courtroom testimony regarding how he came
into possession of farmland previously owned by the Blooming-
dales. "
The trial court denied Doss's motion to compel production, ruling
that the interviews were subject to the attorney-client privilege, and that
the privilege had not been waived even though two friends of the
Bloomingdales, Jacquelyn Morris and Shirley Durbin, were present
during the interviews. 6 The appellate court noted that Baughman
understood at the time of the interview that both Mrs. Morris and Mrs.
Durbin "played a role in the Bloomingdales' affairs," were concerned
about the Bloomingdales' relationship with Doss, and "solicited legal
advice as to what recourse the Bloomingdales might have against"
Doss. 17 Additionally, the court noted that Mrs. Morris later served as
the guardian of Eugene Bloomingdale's estate, and in that capacity,
retained Baughman to sue Doss.' 8 There was also testimony from
Baughman that Eugene Bloomingdale needed the assistance of others
to obtain legal services. 9 Further, it was uncontradicted that Mrs.
Durbin was present during the interviews at the Bloomingdales'
request and for the purpose of providing "moral support and encour-
agement to the Bloomingdales in obtaining legal advice., 20 This
evidence led the trial court to conclude that the Bloomingdales were
probably unsophisticated in the affairs of law, that they did not intend
to waive the attorney-client privilege, and that "common sense"
suggested that the presence of Mrs. Durbin should be allowed so that
future clients would have support available during "particularly trying"
periods.2 '
13. 514 N.E.2d 502 (I11. App. Ct. 1987).
14. Id. at 503-05.
15. Id. Eugene Bloomingdale had previously inherited the farmland and had retained
Doss to handle the probate of the estate in which the farmland constituted the primary
asset. Id. at 504.
16. Id.







The appellate court disagreed, reasoning that although Mrs. Morris
may have been an agent of the Bloomingdales, there was no evidence
that Mrs. Durbin was the Bloomingdales' agent or advisor.22 The
appellate court noted that Mrs. Durbin herself had testified that despite
Eugene Bloomingdale's "possibly low intelligence level," the
Bloomingdales needed no help in communicating important informa-
tion to their attorney. The appellate court stated that although the
sentiments of the trial court were "admirable," its ruling was contrary
to Illinois law, under which "the presence of a third person [ordinarily]
indicates a lack of intention that the communications of a client to his
attorney are meant to be confidential., 24 The appellate court made it
clear that in Illinois, a client may not employ an agent simply to
provide moral support.
With its cursory reference to client agency, the Himmel court failed
to discuss whether the "admirable" sentiments of the trial court in Doss
should remain unsupported by Illinois law. Substantively, Himmel
may in one sense affirm the Illinois Appellate Court's Doss decision
by holding that under Illinois law a client's agent must do more than
provide moral support and encouragement. The Himmel court,
however, did not reexamine this policy, which the Doss trial court
purportedly found to fly in the face of "common sense., 26 In addition
to failing to address the concerns present in Doss, the Himmel court
failed to articulate the circumstances under which family members and
close friends might be deemed agents of clients. Procedurally,
Himmel sheds no light on how Kenneth Baughman, James Himmel,
or other Illinois attorneys can: (1) better assure their clients that a
privilege will attach to attorney-client communications even though a
third party is present, and (2) better advocate to a court that the attor-
ney-client privilege has not been waived even though a third party was
present during the communication.
When should family members and friends be deemed agents of
individual clients during attorney-client communications? How should
such agency issues be presented and resolved by the lawyers and
judges confronting them? The following discussion offers a few
suggestions.
22. Doss, 514 N.E.2d at 504.
23. Id. at 505.
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III. AGENTS OF INDIVIDUAL CLIENTS
The courts in both Doss and Himmel assumed that individual clients
of attorneys may be accompanied by some form of "agent" during
attorney-client communications, even though the courts concluded that
such an agency did not exist under the circumstances.2 ' A clear illus-
tration of a client's agent is a person who facilitates dialogue by serv-
ing as a translator of language. 28 The appellate courts in Doss and
Himmel, however, did not compare the role of such translators with
the roles of Shirley Durbin or Tammy Forsberg's mother and fianc6.
Had the court made these comparisons, the court would have recog-
nized that the benefits that a client receives from the presence of a
language translator are very similar to those received from close
friends or relatives.
In In re Busse's Estate29 the Illinois Appellate Court compared the
role of a translator to that of a special companion who is present at
attorney-client communications. 30 The court in Busse's Estate
reasoned that an interpreter's presence at an attorney-client consultation
is occasionally required by "reason of necessity," and thus would not
automatically destroy the confidentiality of the consultation. 3, The
court also stated that at times an interpreter must be present at attorney-
client conferences in order for counsel to obtain accurate information.32
The Busse 's Estate court went further, however, and suggested that
a rule recognizing only an interpreter as a person whose presence is
necessary would be "too narrow" because it would exclude the pres-
ence of other agents, who, in at least some instances, must be present
at attorney-client conferences so that counsel may obtain accurate
information.33 The court determined that Helen Collins, a friend of
Marie Busse, was present "as an agent, servant or employee" of Mrs.
Busse during Mrs. Busse's consultation with her lawyer.34 The court
found it significant that Mrs. Collins provided care to Mrs. Busse,
drove Mrs. Busse around in the Collins's car, and attended to Mrs.
Busse's business affairs.35 Consequently, the court concluded that the
27. See Himmel, 533 N.E.2d at 794-95; Doss, 514 N.E.2d at 505.
28. See infra text accompanying note 32.
29. Collins v. Utley (In re Busse's Estate), 75 N.E.2d 36 (Ill. App. Ct. 1947).




34. Busse's Estate, 75 N.E.2d at 41.
35. Id. at 37. One commentator agreed with the court's agency determination but
argued that the communications were not privileged because they were not "connected
with the legal business at hand." Note, The Attorney-Client Privilege as Affected by
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consultation was not "out of the privileged communication rule. 36
Neither the Doss nor Himmel courts considered the holding of
Busse's Estate, and thus never considered whether a similar approach
may have been appropriate in those cases.37 Outside of Illinois,
however, courts and legislatures have employed approaches compara-
ble to the one used in Busse's Estate when formulating client agency
principles that would seemingly cover the companions in both the
Himmel and Doss cases.
In United States v. Bigos, 38 the United States Court of Appeals for
the First Circuit considered whether a father's presence during his
son's conversation with an attorney vitiated the attorney-client privi-
lege.39 In Bigos, Dennis Raimondi appealed his criminal conspiracy
conviction on the grounds that he was denied the use of a statement
made by his alleged co-conspirator, Edgar McDonald, to McDonald's
attomey.' In a brief discussion, the First Circuit reasoned that in spite
of the prevailing rule that the presence of a third party destroys the
attorney-client privilege, the client's communication was properly
treated as privileged by the trial court because there was insufficient
indication that McDonald and his attorney intended that their communi-
cations would not be confidential.4a
The First Circuit revisited its Bigos holding in a similar case, Kevlik
v. Goldstein.42 In Kevlik, the court again reasoned that the client's
intention of confidentiality should be determinative on the question of
whether attorney-client communications were privileged.43 The Kevlik
court characterized the actions of the client's father, who was present
during the communications between his son and his son's attorney, as
"normal and supportive." 44 Such supportive actions were of the same
type that were characterized as "admirable" by the Illinois Appellate
Third Part.'s Presence, 15 U. CHI. L. REV. 989, 992 (1948).
36. Busse's Estate, 75 N.E. 2d at 41.
37. Although Doss cited Busse's Estate for the proposition that the presence of a
client's agent will not destroy the attorney-client privilege, the Doss court did not
consider whether Shirley Durbin may have served in a role similar to the one filled by
Helen Collins in Busse's Estate. See Doss, 514 N.E.2d at 505.
38. 459 F.2d 639 (1st Cir. 1972).
39. Id. at 643.
40. Id. at 640, 643. Raimondi sought to use McDonald's statement to prove that he
did not conspire with McDonald and others to hijack a truck and move stolen goods in
interstate commerce. Id. at 643.
41. Id.
42. 724 F.2d 844 (1st Cir. 1984).
43. Id. at 849.
44. Id.
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Court in Doss.45
An approach comparable to the First Circuit's view is found in
Section 952 of California's Evidence Code, which defines
"[c]onfidential communication between client and lawyer"46 as:
information transmitted between a client and his lawyer in the
course of that relationship and in confidence by a means which,
so far as the client is aware, discloses the information to no third
persons other than those who are present to further the interest
of the client in the consultation or those to whom disclosure is
reasonably necessary for the transmission of the information or
the accomplishment of the purpose for which the lawyer is
consulted, and includes a legal opinion formed and the advice
given by the lawyer in the course of that relationship.
47
Any doubt that this definition would apply to Shirley Durbin and to
Tammy Forsberg's companions is dispelled in the Law Revision
Commission Comment 48 accompanying this section, wherein the
legislative intent is described as follows:
The words "other than those who are present to further the
interest of the client in the consultation" indicate that a
communication to a lawyer is nonetheless confidential even
though it is made in the presence of another person-such as a
spouse, parent, business associate, or joint client-who is present
to further the interest of the client in the consultation .... This
may change existing law, for the presence of a third person
45. See Doss, 514 N.E.2d at 505.
46. CAL. EvID. CODE § 952 (West 1994).
47. Id. Both federal and state courts frequently use Proposed Fed. R. Evid. 503(a)(4),
which is similar to § 952, as a guide in their decisions. See, e.g., Suburban Sew 'N
Sweep, Inc. v. Swiss-Bernina, Inc., 91 F.R.D. 254, 259 (N.D. I11. 1981); Strong v.
State, 773 S.W.2d 543, 552 n.I1 (Tex. Crim. App. 1989). Although the United States
Supreme Court proposed that Rule 503 be adopted, Congress chose instead to adopt the
more general Rule 501, which covers all privileges generally. Commentators have
noted that:
Questions as to the effect of the presence of persons other than the client and
the lawyer often arise .... As to relatives and friends of the client, the results
of the cases are not consistent, but it seems that here not only might it be
asked whether the client reasonably understood the conference to be confiden-
tial but also whether the presence of the relative or friend was reasonably
necessary for the protection of the client's interests in the particular circum-
stances.
CHARLES T. MCCORMICK, MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 91, at 128 (4th ed., 1992)
(footnotes omitted).
48. In 1965, the Commission recommended that the California legislature adopt an
evidence code. During that same year, the legislature adopted a code provision similar to
the one recommended by the Commission. The Official Comments of the Commission
were adopted by the California Assembly and Senate Committees on Judiciary as reflect-
ing the Committees' intent. Foreword to CAL. EvID. CODE (West 1966).
488 [Vol. 25
Attorney-Client Communication
sometimes has been held to destroy the confidential character of
the consultation, even where the third person was present
because of his concern for the welfare of the client.49
The "admirable sentiments" of the First Circuit and the California
legislature should be incorporated into Illinois law by the Illinois
Supreme Court. Although the First Circuit did not discuss principles
of agency in its Bigos and Kevlik opinions, the First Circuit's
approach suggests that the client's needs should be considered in
determining whether attorney-client confidentiality is to be honored.
Similarly, under the California approach, the question of whether the
third party's presence is in the best interests of the client is crucial to
determining whether the privilege has been preserved. To incorporate
these principles, the Illinois Supreme Court need not overrule existing
precedent. For instance, Himmel and Doss could be read to declare
simply that a client's agent must do more than provide moral, support
and encouragement to the client.5° The supreme court could clarify
Himmel's uncertainty by declaring that an agent's presence must be
necessary to the effective representation of the client. Thus, the
agent's presence must significantly enhance the attorney's opportuni-
ties to obtain accurate factual information from the client and for the
client to understand any legal advice rendered by the attorney.
5'
Even if the Illinois Supreme Court were to recognize explicitly that
the presence of a third party who significantly enhances effective
attorney-client communications does not destroy confidentiality, attor-
neys must still decide which third parties might be eligible to attend
attorney-client meetings. Though necessary for more effective
communication, certain people may not be indispensable and might be
excluded for other reasons. For example, even where a particular
49. CAL. EViD. CODE § 952, Law Revision Commission's Comment (West 1966).
50. Thus, a client's intent that the communication be kept confidential alone would
not be dispositive. This view is consistent with Dean Wigmore's definition of the
attorney-client privilege, upon which the Illinois courts rely. See, e.g., People v.
Adam, 280 N.E.2d 205, 207 (111. 1972) (listing Wigmore's essentials for the creation
and continuation of the attorney-client privilege (quoting 8 JOHN H. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE
§ 2292 (McNaughton rev. ed. 1961))). Wigmore wrote that waiver of the privilege is
guided by elements of "fairness and consistency" as well as "intention." Specifically,
he said: "A privileged person would seldom be found to waive, if his intention ... could
alone control . . . . There is always also the objective consideration that when his
conduct touches a certain point . . . fairness requires that his privilege shall cease .
8 JOHN H. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2327, at 636 (McNaughton rev. ed. 1961).
5 1. The view that necessity should dictate the existence of an agency relation within
the context of the attorney-client privilege is not universally followed. See, e.g,
Michael G. Walsh, Annotation, Applicability of Attorney-Client Privilege to
Communications Made in Presence of or Solely to or by Third Person, 14 A.L.R. 4TH
594, 614-24 (1982) (reviewing the conflicting case law on the matter).
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person's presence might in some ways enhance attorney-client
communications, that person's presence might also pose dangers to
effective representation of the client. Certain people may have their
own general or particular biases, personal information or opinions
about the relevant events, or financial interests in the outcome of the
legal representation. Thus, even in a situation where a third party
would enhance attorney-client communications, a lawyer may find that
a certain person would not make a good agent for the client. In this
situation, for the client's own protection, the client should be advised
to find a different agent before attorney-client communications can
begin or continue.
IV. ESTABLISHING AGENCY FOR INDIVIDUAL CLIENTS
In addition to recognizing that an individual client's agent may be
anyone the client needs to insure that the client effectively communi-
cates with the attorney and comprehends the attorney's legal advice,
new guidance is needed so that attorneys can establish the grounds for
agency before communications with clients begin in the presence of
third parties. Such guidance would also be beneficial to attorneys
seeking to preserve the privileged status of attorney-client communica-
tions when access to those communications is sought through pretrial
discovery, trial testimony, or otherwise.
A. Establishing the Grounds for Agency Before
Communicating with a Client
New Illinois precedent should recognize that an individual can be a
client's agent during attorney-client communications if the grounds for
the agency were established prior to the onset of communications
involving professional legal services. A requirement that attorneys
establish such grounds before communications begin would help
insure that confidentiality was truly intended and reduce the possibility
of after-the-fact attempts to recast communications as confidential. In
the absence of such precedent, how could a Kenneth Baughman or a
James Himmel go about establishing that a client's family member or
other companion is needed for enhanced attorney-client communication
and should thus be viewed as an agent of the client?
Initially, an attorney about to discuss legal affairs with an individual
client in the presence of a third party should ask the client to identify
the third party and to explain why the client has asked that party to be
present. The attorney should generally instruct the client about the
attorney-client privilege and about how the privilege may or may not
be available if the third party is present only to provide moral support,
490 [Vol. 25
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to satisfy her curiosity, to tell what she knows of the relevant events,
or to evaluate the attorney for her own purposes. Should the client
only generally indicate that the third party's presence would be helpful,
the attorney should inquire further about the type of aid that the third
party could provide. The attorney should explain the different conse-
quences likely to follow if the third party's assistance involves an
accounting of what she knows about the client's problems, rather than
lending significant assistance to the client in speaking to and under-
standing the attorney. Once the attorney determines that the third party
is likely an "agent" of the client under the previously described
standard, the need to maintain confidentiality should be explained to
both the client and the third party. Furthermore, the attorney should
mention the risks associated with the third party's presence due to
Himmel's ambiguities. The attorney should also discuss other
dangers, including the possibility of later disclosure of attorney-client
communications by the third party and the possibility that such disclo-
sure might destroy the privilege.52
B. Advocating Agency When Compelled Disclosure Is Sought
Because attorney-client communications are often relevant to the
issues in a case, and because Himmel is unclear on agency, an attorney
who has established grounds for agency before rendering professional
legal services in a third party's presence may nonetheless face a
request to reveal the attorney-client communications. Opposing
counsel will argue that the third party's presence demonstrates a lack
of intent to maintain confidentiality. Attorneys in the situations faced
by Kenneth Baughman or James Himmel would counter by urging that
any presumption of nonconfidentiality due to third party presence can
be overcome by showing that reasonable grounds for agency were
established before communications began, and that the client thus
intended confidentiality. Such attorneys should argue, in the words of
52. The attorney is responsible for adequately safeguarding against intentional and
inadvertent disclosure; if she does so, at least "involuntary" disclosures may not undo
the privilege. See Suburban Sew 'N Sweep, Inc. v. Swiss-Bernina, Inc., 91 F.R.D. 254,
260 (N.D. II1. 1981) (defining "inadvertent disclosure" as "where the information is
transmitted in public or otherwise clearly not adequately safeguarded" and "involuntary
disclosure" as "where the information is acquired by third parties in spite of all possible
precautions"); cf Dalen v. Ozite Corp., 594 N.E.2d 1365, 1371 (111. App. Ct. 1992)
(adopting a balancing test for evaluating whether a party waived attorney-client privi-
lege that takes into account "the reasonableness of the precautions taken to prevent the
disclosure").
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Busse's Estate, that the third party's presence was required by "reason
of necessity."53
V. CONCLUSION
The Illinois Supreme Court's Himmel decision raised two dilemmas
facing Illinois lawyers. On the dilemma concerning the tension
between accommodating an individual client's desire for a third party's
presence during attorney-client communications and preserving the
privilege associated with those communications, the justices said little.
The resulting uncertainties regarding who may serve as an agent of an
individual client during attorney-client communications pose signifi-
cant problems for Illinois judges and for Illinois attorneys representing
clients who may have difficulty communicating. The Illinois Supreme
Court should eliminate these uncertainties with new precedents which
better define agency for individual clients and which better describe
how such agency should be initially established and later preserved.
"Common sense" suggests that individual clients of attorneys often
face "particularly trying" times54 and may require the presence of
family members or friends during attorney-client communications so
that professional legal services can be rendered effectively.
53. Busse's Estate, 75 N.E.2d at 40.
54. See Doss, 514 N.E.2d at 505.
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